<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>João Diogo Duarte · Blog</title><link>http://diogoduarte.pt/blog/</link><description>Recent content on João Diogo Duarte · Blog</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="http://diogoduarte.pt/blog/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Understanding collision resistance, quantifiers and (non-)uniformity</title><link>http://diogoduarte.pt/blog/collision-resistance-quantifiers/</link><pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>http://diogoduarte.pt/blog/collision-resistance-quantifiers/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;One of the things I have always loved in cryptography is black-box separation results [RTV04].&#10;Two classic examples are the separation of key agreement (and hence Public Key Encryption) from One-way Permutations (OWP) by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89], and the separation of Collision Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF) from OWPs by Simon [Sim98].&#10;After Simon&amp;rsquo;s seminal paper, I started reading Hsiao and Reyzin&amp;rsquo;s paper on separating public-coin CRHFs from secret-coin CRHFs [HR04], which claims on the first page that&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;blockquote&gt;&#10;&lt;p&gt;It is easy to see there is no meaningful way to formalize the notion of collision-resistance for a single fixed-output-length hash function.&lt;/p&gt;&#10;&lt;/blockquote&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>